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THE LEGITIMACY OF INEQUALITY:  
INTEGRATING THE PERSPECTIVES OF SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENT 
 
ABSTRACT 
To explain the legitimation of inequality among the members of a social system, we blend 
system justification theory and the theory of social judgment. We identify adaptation and re-
placement as two major mechanisms of inequality legitimation and examine their influence in 
the unique setting of a natural experiment, the reunification of socialist East Germany and 
capitalist West Germany. We show that the new members of a society in which inequality is 
broadly endorsed and perceived as enduring will adapt to this perception and come to view 
inequality as acceptable. This process of adaptation reflects the subtle but powerful influence 
of collective legitimacy on an individual’s tacit approval of inequality. Inequality also be-
comes legitimate as older cohorts are replaced by younger cohorts; however, this effect is 
weaker than the effect of adaptation. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that de-
veloping and testing a theory of how inequality becomes legitimized can provide new insights 
into the ideational antecedents of inequality.  
 
Keywords: inequality, legitimacy, natural experiment, system justification, social judgment  
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During the 2016 World Economic Forum in Davos, Oxfam executive Mark Goldring 
complained that it “is simply unacceptable that the poorest half of the world population owns 
no more than a small group of the global super-rich – so few, you could fit them all on a sin-
gle coach” (The Guardian, 2016). Goldring was referring to an Oxfam report revealing that 
the world’s 62 richest people owned as much wealth as the poorest half of the world’s popula-
tion (The Guardian, 2016). This comment and the report that inspired it highlight the huge gap 
between the few “haves” and the many “have-nots.” 
Despite the detrimental impacts of social and economic inequality — including poor 
health (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2015), lower levels of happiness (Alesina et al., 2004), and 
slower economic growth (Halter et al., 2014) — there has been hardly any noteworthy action 
to remedy the causes of this trend. Although such action would arguably be in the interest of 
the large majority of disadvantaged people (Jost et al., 2004), the public discourse typically 
sidesteps the topic of inequality, and there is evidence that the general public shows little con-
cern for inequality (Luttig, 2013). Thus, in blatant opposition to Goldring’s statement, ine-
quality seems to be perceived as acceptable, even to those who are disadvantaged by the sta-
tus quo. The absence of popular resistance to social and economic inequality poses a puzzle, 
because it violates the idea that people demand the redistribution of wealth to maximize their 
self-interest (Trump, 2017) and is at odds with findings that individuals care deeply about 
norms of justice and fairness (Greenberg, 2010; Greenberg and Colquitt, 2005).  
What might explain the tacit approval of the current system, which promotes the preser-
vation of inequality and other forms of social dominance? According to system justification 
theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2015), many members of a social system tend to pre-
serve the belief that existing social arrangements are fair, legitimate, justifiable, and neces-
sary. This belief allows them to satisfy basic psychological needs, such as the need to main-
tain a positive self-image and to believe the world is just. Believing in the legitimacy of a so-
cial system, in turn, disposes people to support that system (Stryker, 1994; Zelditch, 2001a). 
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Thus, the psychological need to justify a system that is perceived as legitimate typically leads 
members of that system to defend and perpetuate the social and economic forms of inequality 
that characterize it.  
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the legitimation of inequality by integrating the 
perspective of system justification with the perspective of social judgment, which originates 
in organization and management studies (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Haack 
et al., 2014; Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 2011). Specifically, we develop and test a novel theory on 
how inequality becomes accepted among the members of a social system and turns into a tak-
en-for-granted and self-perpetuating feature of everyday life (Amis et al., 2017). We define 
“inequality” as the uneven distribution of economic resources, such as income and wealth, as 
well as of other social resources, such as information and social integration, which contribute 
to income or wealth as intervening variables.  
System justification theory proposes that legitimacy, and by extension the legitimation 
of social inequality (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013), can be viewed as a psychological construct 
(Jost and Major, 2001; Tyler, 2006). This stream of research focuses on legitimacy beliefs and 
on the personal and situational contingencies that influence such beliefs and lead the members 
of a system to justify them. However, to date few studies adopting the system justification 
perspective have examined how approval and conformity at the individual level emerge from 
personal beliefs that derive from the legitimacy beliefs that other members of a group hold. In 
contrast, the perspective of social judgment argues that legitimacy can be viewed as an ongo-
ing process of judgment formation. The proponents of this perspective assume that this pro-
cess is multi-level, in the sense that legitimacy judgments occur simultaneously at the collec-
tive level (where perceptions of appropriateness are created, shared, and validated) and at the 
level of the individual, who uses collective perceptions to derive his or her judgment and en-
gage in appropriate action (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Johnson et al., 2006).  
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Blending the perspectives of system justification and social judgment allows us to theo-
rize that in social systems where inequality is (perceived to be) high but widely accepted, the 
members of those systems are likely to regard inequality as acceptable, as a result of a process 
of adaptation. In this view, the “validity belief” about inequality—that is, the belief that ine-
quality objectively exists and is approved collectively by the members of a social group—
generates and supports “propriety beliefs” about inequality—that is, an individual’s ac-
ceptance of inequality. Social systems that are considered valid thus have a bolstering effect 
on beliefs about propriety (Zelditch, 2001b). The context of inequality naturally leads to an 
understanding of propriety as acceptability, meaning that a legitimacy object does not require 
explicit support (“strong validation”) but can maintain propriety as long it is not questioned or 
challenged (“weak validation”) (Johnson et al., 2006). 
Taking into account that individuals may not adapt to the perceived consensus in a so-
cial system and instead remain committed to their previous beliefs (Tilcsik, 2010), we further 
theorize that changes in legitimacy beliefs may be also driven by the process of replacement 
(Ryder, 1965), through which younger cohorts replace older cohorts. Because each cohort 
grows up in a unique historical context, the members of different cohorts often hold different 
values and beliefs. Thus, we may assume that the members of a society who believe in the 
legitimacy of inequality come to substitute members who dispute the legitimacy of inequality, 
as the latter quit the social system (mainly because of death, but also due to relocation). In this 
view, differences between outgoing and incoming cohorts may explain changes in legitimacy 
beliefs (King, 2011). 
We test our theory in the context of the German reunification, the process through 
which the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR; also referred to as “East Germany”) 
joined the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (FRG; also referred to as “West Germany”) 
to form a united Germany. The case of the German reunification lends itself to our theory-
building exercise because it resembles a “natural experiment,” in which exposure to the 
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treatment and control conditions is determined by factors outside the control of the researcher. 
Specifically, the former citizens of the GDR can be regarded as the treatment group, because 
they experienced the transition from a socialist system (which placed great emphasis on 
equality) to a capitalist system (in which inequalities were regarded as legitimate; (van der 
Toorn et al., 2010). The citizens of the FRG can be regarded as the control group, because 
they did not experience this transition. The case of East Germany is of broad interest, because 
there are other countries (e.g., China and Cuba) that may experience a similar transition from 
socialism to a free-market economy in the near future.  
This paper’s contribution is fourfold. First, we advance our understanding of the idea-
tional and social dynamics of inequality legitimation by complementing the theory of system 
justification, which focuses on the individual level and treats legitimacy as a state, with the 
theory of social judgment, which views legitimacy as a multi-level processual phenomenon. 
This study supports empirically the view that we develop; namely, that inequality becomes 
accepted among members of a social system through processes of adaptation and replacement. 
Second, we add to theories of legitimacy from the social judgment perspective by empirically 
demonstrating the subtle but powerful influence of collective-level or “generalized” percep-
tions of legitimacy on an individual’s approval and consent. Extant research on the formation 
of social judgments leans towards theory development, and much of the scholarship on legit-
imacy is “highly theoretical, invoking legitimacy as an explanatory concept rather than exam-
ining it as an empirical attribute” (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008, p. 49). Thus, we believe 
that our study, which engages in the empirical analysis of legitimacy as a dependent variable 
and a phenomenon in its own right, makes a timely contribution to research on legitimacy. 
Third, we contribute to the development of a microfoundational agenda in research on institu-
tions and inequality (Amis et al., 2017). Unlike other theoretical perspectives in management 
studies (Felin et al., 2015), institutional theory has paid little attention to the microfoundations 
of institutions (Sieweke, 2014), despite calls for further inquiry into this topic (Cornelissen et 
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al., 2015; Powell and Colyvas, 2008). Our study emphasizes that, in order to study the micro-
foundations of inequality legitimation, research must go beyond micro-level explanations and 
seek the links between the micro-level and macro-level structures and outcomes (Bitektine 
and Haack, 2015). Finally, our theory has implications for the study of management and or-
ganizations in general, particularly for research on consequences of inequality in organiza-
tions (e.g., Bloom and Michel, 2002) and for research on organizational justice (e.g., 
Greenberg and Colquitt, 2005). 
THE LEGITIMACY OF INEQUALITY  
The legitimacy of inequality can be examined from several perspectives (e.g., Jost and 
Major, 2001). In the present paper, we focus on two approaches that we consider particularly 
promising: the perspective of system justification and the perspective of social judgment. Sys-
tem justification theory suggests that social outcomes (including social and economic inequal-
ity) are perceived as legitimate because the members of a social system are motivated to think 
of their system as fair, just, and desirable. In turn, social judgment theory argues that legiti-
macy objects are perceived as legitimate either because members of the system approve of 
these objects or because they recognize and consent to the widespread approval of these ob-
jects. Legitimacy objects include properties that characterize a social system, such as inequali-
ty. In the following section, we compare both bodies of literature to develop an integrated 
theory of how inequality is legitimized among the members of a social system. Our guiding 
assumption is that, in order to understand the ideational antecedents of the material fact of in-
equality, it is necessary to develop and test a theory of legitimation (Della-Fave, 1986). 
The System Justification Perspective  
System justification theory aims to explain how, when, and why the members of a social 
system support the status quo (e.g., various forms of inequality), even if they are disadvan-
taged as a result (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). This theory suggests that individu-
als are motivated to hold favorable beliefs about the legitimacy of the social system in which 
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they live and work, due to the basic psychological need to believe the social system is fair and 
to maintain a positive self-image. For the advantaged members of a system, justifying that 
system as legitimate simply reflects the ideological promotion and rationalization of a good 
situation; for disadvantaged members, justifying the system prevents feelings of frustration 
and reduces the mental harm associated with being part of a system that is contrary to their 
self-interest (Jost et al., 2015; Jost and Hunyady, 2005).  
Justifying the system fosters the legitimation of inequality and thus perpetuates both in-
equality and other forms of social dominance. Several studies supporting the predictions of 
system justification theory have identified personal and situational contingencies that influ-
ence the degree to which individuals justify the system to which they belong (Kay and 
Friesen, 2011). For instance, research has found that individuals perceive a system to be more 
legitimate if it is durable (e.g., Blanchar and Eidelman, 2013), stable (e.g., Laurin et al., 
2013), or difficult to escape (e.g., Kay et al., 2009b).  
Regarding personal factors, research shows, counter-intuitively, that disadvantaged in-
dividuals, such as people with a low income, are more likely to support the status quo and to 
justify inequality than advantaged individuals are (Jost et al., 2003c). Furthermore, the politi-
cal orientations of individuals, as well as cognitive factors such as tolerance of ambiguity and 
openness to experience, are related to the degree to which people justify the system to which 
they belong (Jost et al., 2003b; Kay et al., 2009a).  
System justification theory focuses on legitimacy at the level of individuals and concep-
tualizes it as an attitudinal construct and a relatively stable state. The emphasis on stability 
may stem from the fact that research has mostly analyzed justification beliefs in the context of 
systems that have achieved a high degree of institutionalization, such as the free-market econ-
omy in industrialized countries (Jost et al., 2003a). It may also reflect the cross-sectional 
study designs that much of this stream of research has employed to analyze system justifica-
tion and legitimacy at a given point in time. Consequently, system justification theory offers 
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few insights into the social dynamics that underlie the legitimacy judgments that individuals 
make. For that reason, we turn to the social judgment perspective.  
The Social Judgment Perspective  
In organization studies, legitimacy is commonly defined as a “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some so-
cially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Legitimacy has been largely conceptualized as a perceptual phenomenon (Suchman, 1995); in 
other words, legitimacy is in “the eye of the beholder” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 177). On 
those grounds, researchers have drawn on cognitive and social psychology (e.g., Sherif and 
Hovland, 1961) and micro-sociology (e.g., Walker et al., 1986) to develop a theory of the in-
ter-subjective and perceptual processes that underlie legitimacy judgments (Bitektine, 2011; 
Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Haack et al., 2014; Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 2011). From the per-
spective of the resulting theory of social judgment, the focal object of legitimation can be any 
behavioral pattern that occurs within an organization or social systems. This “pattern” might 
be, among other things, a rule, an organization, or a system of inequality (Johnson, 2004, p. 
10-11).  
The legitimacy construct has become prominent in organization studies and, in particu-
lar, in institutional theory (Deephouse et al., 2017). Many scholars, however, rely on Such-
man’s (1995) rather broad definition of legitimacy, without specifying what particular aspect 
of legitimacy they are examining (Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). Scholars 
who apply the social judgment perspective have stressed that it is important to refine the 
meaning of legitimacy while, at the same time, conserving the concept’s inherently multifac-
eted nature. In these scholars’ view, legitimacy is an intricate social process comprising three 
perceptual components: validity, validity beliefs and propriety beliefs.  
Validity refers to the construal of appropriateness at the collective level (i.e., by a group 
as a whole). An important aspect of validity is that it exists objectively as a social fact and in-
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dependently of the opinion of a single individual. This objectified part of legitimacy enters the 
cognition of individuals as a “validity cue,” which they can use to form a validity belief. A 
validity belief can be described as an individual’s judgment that a legitimacy object is per-
ceived as appropriate by others in a collectivity of individuals, independently of whether the 
focal individual regards that object as legitimate (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). The term pro-
priety belief refers to an individual’s private endorsement of a legitimacy object and his or her 
assessment of the appropriateness or acceptability of that object (Suddaby et al., 2017).i 
Suchman’s (1995) seminal definition of legitimacy focuses on the aspect of validity and 
thus describes legitimacy primarily at the collective level (Zelditch, 2004). However, that def-
inition does not sufficiently take into account propriety and validity beliefs and therefore does 
not adequately describe legitimacy at the individual level. In contrast, scholars in the social 
judgment tradition try to focus more closely on a specific aspect of legitimacy. In line with 
this approach, we aim to focus on propriety beliefs, which will serve as our key outcome vari-
able, but we will also consider validity beliefs, which will serve as an important context vari-
able.  
According to the social judgment perspective, a legitimacy object is perceived as valid 
if it observably governs the views and actions of the authorities and of one’s peers (Johnson et 
al., 2006). Individuals who do not privately endorse that object as proper may nevertheless 
believe that others perceive it as appropriate and therefore tacitly approve its behavioral pre-
scriptions. If an individual’s propriety beliefs are incongruent with his or her validity beliefs, 
that individual may suppress the former and act upon the latter (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). 
Over time, individuals tend to adjust their propriety beliefs so that they are congruent with the 
prevalent validity beliefs in the broader group to which they belong; in other words, validity 
beliefs may influence propriety beliefs (Walker et al., 1986; Yoon and Thye, 2011; Zelditch 
and Walker, 1984). A legitimacy object can acquire propriety and retain this quality so long as 
it is neither questioned nor challenged (“weak validation”). Thus, explicit support or approval 
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(“strong validation”) is not always necessary for propriety. In this paper we posit that, in order 
for inequality to acquire propriety, even weak validation and tacit approval by a majority of 
individuals is sufficient. Individuals are unlikely to support inequality actively and enthusias-
tically, but they are likely to accept it passively (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
To conclude, the perspective of social judgment posits that legitimacy judgments occur 
simultaneously at the collective level, where perceptions of appropriateness are created, 
shared, and typified (and thus generate validity), and at the level of individuals, who derive 
personal judgments (i.e., validity and propriety beliefs) from those collective perceptions and 
then engage in appropriate action, such as resisting or complying with a social system. Im-
portantly, because individuals grant valid legitimacy objects the status of objective, natural, 
and inevitable facts, validity beliefs lead them to recognize a specific normative order as bind-
ing, which in turn fosters behavioral consent (Stryker, 1994). 
Towards the Integration of the Two Theories 
While system justification theory has identified the psychological underpinnings of le-
gitimacy (Jost and Major, 2001; Tyler, 2006) and advanced a social psychological perspective 
on the legitimation of social inequality (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013), it has yet to acknowledge 
that individuals and their propriety beliefs are influenced by validity cues as signals of gener-
alized perceptions of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). Furthermore, system justifica-
tion theory tends to take an essentialist view of legitimacy, which it conceptualizes as a state 
or enduring property of a social system.  
By contrast, according to the theory of social judgment, the constituent components of 
legitimacy are not fixed or static, but dynamic and in flux. This suggests that beliefs about the 
legitimacy of inequalities can become institutionalized or deinstitutionalized among the mem-
bers of a social system over time, in the sense that they constitute a widely accepted and un-
questioned feature of “how things are” and “how things are done” (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967).  
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Moreover, the theory of social judgment argues that legitimacy cannot be reduced to a 
merely psychological construct but, rather, involves both individual-level and collective-level 
components, which are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. This crucial difference 
shows that, although both approaches to legitimacy concentrate on similar phenomena—
namely, what motivates people to form legitimacy beliefs and the factors and processes 
through which such beliefs are formed—they make different assumptions about the ontologi-
cal status of legitimacy and focus on different levels of analysis. Specifically, system justifica-
tion theory perceives legitimacy as a state and focuses on beliefs formed at the level of indi-
viduals, whereas social judgment theory perceives legitimacy as a process that takes place on 
multiple levels. Notwithstanding these differences, we suggest that the common ground that 
these two perspectives share allows for their theoretical integration (Okhuysen and Bonardi, 
2011). Moreover, we argue that they are complementary and, as we will discuss below, that 
combining them helps us to gain further insight into the mechanisms that preserve social and 
economic inequality.  
More specifically, system justification theory can be enriched by the view that individu-
al beliefs about legitimacy accrue through processes of social interaction and collective-level 
construal of legitimacy, which is central to the theory of social judgment and highlights the 
inherently contextual foundation of legitimacy. Similarly, the temporal dimension of legiti-
macy, which is also central to the theory of social judgment, broadens the narrower scope of 
the system justification theory. In turn, the social judgment approach, which hardly examines 
the perceptual antecedents of individual-level judgments of legitimacy, can benefit from in-
corporating insights from social psychology on system justification. Furthermore, the primari-
ly conceptual contributions to the literature on social judgment theory (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; 
Tost, 2011) can benefit from the depth and rigor of the empirical research that underpins the 
system justification theory, because the legitimacy construct in system justification resembles 
the concept of propriety belief in the social judgment perspective. Finally, in the context of 
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our study, the insights into inequality that system justification theory provides help us to re-
fine the general scope of social judgment theory. Overall, blending the two perspectives offers 
an opportunity to develop a comprehensive and useful theory of the inter-subjective processes 
of perception, interpretation, and interactions that are constitutive of the material antecedents 
and outcomes of inequality.  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
In the following section, we build on research on social change (e.g., Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Ryder, 1965) and theorize two major mechanisms that may underlie 
the legitimation of inequality—adaptation and replacement. The process that these mecha-
nisms support and through which inequality may acquire legitimacy in the eyes of individuals 
is what we call the “legitimation of inequality.”  
Adaptation 
A first mechanism that may facilitate the legitimation of inequality is adaptation. 
Through this process, people adapt their values and standards to what they perceive as the es-
tablished and valid norms of society, eventually altering their identities to a point at which 
they acquiesce to inequality. According to the integrated perspective on legitimacy that we 
propose, the influence of validity and validity beliefs on the propriety beliefs of individuals 
may result in adaptation. When individuals exposed to inequality within their system “adapt,” 
they adjust and update their beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality, especially when they 
perceive that many members of this system—particularly actors who have some form of au-
thority, such as regulators, judges, experts, and the media (Bitektine and Haack, 2015)—
endorse it. In this view, actual or perceived validity and the cognitive orientation that it fosters 
have a subtle yet powerful influence on attitudinal approval and behavioral consent (Stryker, 
1994). In other words, the “facticity” of inequality—the representation and perception of ine-
quality as a fact—affects the legitimacy of inequality. The greater is the confidence that indi-
viduals have in “how things are” and the more they have externalized and objectified a given 
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social order, the bigger will be the impact of validity on perceptions of “how things ought to 
be” (i.e., on the propriety of the established social order; (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This 
argument is in line with empirical evidence that experiencing pronounced inequality in terms 
of income has a positive effect on the perception that differences in income are legitimate 
(Trump, 2017) and with the finding that actual or perceived levels of inequality affect what is 
considered a legitimate level of inequality (Austen, 2002; Kelley and Zagorski, 2004).  
More broadly, our conjecture is in line with the findings of previous research that indi-
viduals adjust their identities (e.g., Ibarra, 1999) and cognitive schemata (Wang and Morris, 
2010) when new environmental stimuli generate perceptions that are inconsistent with the be-
liefs and worldviews they previously held (Fiske and Taylor, 2013). For instance, Lok (2010) 
found that as the concept of shareholder value gained ground, both corporate decision-makers 
and institutional investors adapted their identities to this increasingly dominant concept. 
Likewise, research on institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) has stressed that novice ac-
tors (i.e., actors with little experience of a certain logic) have to learn the “rules” of that logic 
in order to become socialized and to be able to act proficiently. Psychological research on atti-
tudes also indicates that individuals develop their beliefs and worldviews through their inter-
action with the social world. For instance, according to the theory of social learning, people 
develop their beliefs about novel objects by observing others (Bandura, 1977)—an idea that 
bears striking similarity to sociological views of institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  
Drawing on these findings, we posit that people with little exposure to inequality adjust 
their propriety beliefs in line with what they perceive as the validity (i.e., the perceived inevi-
tability, strength, and collective approval) of inequality.  
Hypothesis 1: The process of adaptation facilitates the legitimation of inequality 
among the new members of a system of inequality over time. 
15 
 
Furthermore, we assume that, within a given system, the speed with which individuals 
adapt their propriety beliefs to the perceived validity of inequality is contingent on these indi-
viduals’ previous exposure to a system of equality. We suggest that the longer individuals 
have lived in and experienced a system of equality, the slower will be their adaptation to a 
system of inequality. Our conjecture is corroborated by the theory of social judgment, which 
distinguishes between the stage of “judgment formation” and the stage of “judgment use” 
(Tost, 2011). In the stage of judgment formation, individuals consciously and unconsciously 
process and evaluate information they receive to form legitimacy judgments, which they then 
deploy in the stage of “judgment use.” Earlier studies indicate that the more frequently cogni-
tive schemas are activated and confirmed, the stronger they become (e.g., Schützwohl, 1998). 
On that basis, we argue that the more often individuals use their legitimacy judgments, the 
stronger and more resilient their propriety beliefs become. As a consequence, the longer these 
individuals have lived in a system of equality, the weaker will be their propriety belief in the 
legitimacy of inequality.  
We argue that a strong and firmly established belief in the legitimacy of equality can 
negatively affect the speed with which individuals adapt to a system of inequality—a point 
which is supported by research on social cognition as well as by the literature on system justi-
fication. First, there is ample evidence that individuals interpret new information in a way that 
supports their previously held beliefs and that they are more likely to ignore information that 
is inconsistent with these beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). Taber and Lodge (2006) have concluded 
that most people are “motivated skeptics” who actively seek to refute contrary arguments on 
issues that they support and feel competent to judge. Transferring these insights to our con-
text, we suggest that individuals with strong propriety beliefs in the legitimacy of equality are 
less likely to reassess their unfavorable judgment about inequality, even when they become 
members of a system in which inequality is deemed legitimate, because they tend to ignore or 
argue against inconsistent information.  
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Second, according to system justification theory, individuals tend to hold favorable pro-
priety beliefs about the system in which they currently live and work. What motivates them to 
do so is the need to believe in a just world and to maintain a positive self-image (Jost et al., 
2015). For the same reason, we expect that individuals are motivated to hold favorable propri-
ety beliefs about the system in which they have lived in the past, particularly if that system is 
now devalued (e.g., by members of the new system; (Jost et al., 2004). We argue that the 
longer individuals have lived in a system of equality, the more likely they will be to hold fa-
vorable beliefs about this system and to believe that the new system lacks legitimacy.  
However, it seems unlikely that individuals who have lived in a system of equality for a 
long time will reject a system of inequality indefinitely. Because perceptions of validity create 
a normative order that rests on the recognition of “how things are,” the day-to-day experience 
of inequality and the very facticity of inequality will eventually re-orient the propriety beliefs 
of these individuals (Zelditch, 2001b). This conjecture is in line with evidence that individuals 
are more likely to judge as proper a legitimacy object that is valid (Walker et al., 1988). We 
expect that this likelihood is higher when individuals are exposed to validity cues for an ex-
tended period of time. Also, we suppose that, over time, individuals will identify less with the 
system in which they lived in the past and will identify more with the system in which they 
currently live and work. Consequently, we expect that individuals who have been exposed to 
a system of equality for a long time will gradually adapt to a system of inequality, even if they 
initially opposed that system. This leads us to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The longer the new members of a system of inequality have 
been exposed to a system of equality, the more slowly these members will 
adapt their propriety beliefs to the perceived validity of inequality.  
Replacement  
A second mechanism that may facilitate the legitimation of inequality among the new 
members of a system of inequality is that of replacement (Firebaugh, 1992; Ryder, 1965), 
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which refers to the process through which younger cohorts gradually replace older cohorts 
within a social system. Research has shown that replacement processes often account for 
changes in values and beliefs within a social system, because the values and beliefs of the 
younger generation differ from those of the older generation, mainly as a result of their differ-
ent socialization and experience. For instance, Tilcsik (2010) demonstrated that the budgeting 
system of a post-communist bureaucracy only changed after members of the “Old Guard” 
were replaced by “Reformists,” a group of young technocrats who held favorable legitimacy 
beliefs about a new market-based budgeting system. The pivotal effect of cohort replacement 
is also illustrated by a study conducted by Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003, p. 808), which 
shows that the institutional change from classic to nouvelle cuisine was “accomplished gradu-
ally when a chef succeeded his father or father-in-law.” Given that “cohort differences may 
often matter more than life stage differences” (i.e., adaptation), King (2011) concluded that it 
is strange that past research has ignored cohort replacement as an important micro-level pro-
cess of institutional change.  
We expect that the process of replacement, particularly due to generational changes, fa-
cilitates the legitimation of a system of inequality. From an integrated legitimacy perspective, 
and on the grounds that led us to posit the previous hypothesis, we believe that people who 
have lived in a system of equality for a long time will adapt relatively slowly to a system of 
inequality. However, these people will be gradually replaced by a new generation of people 
who will be born into the system of inequality and thus will have no commitment to or per-
sonal interest in a system of equality. For this reason, we argue that the collective-level legit-
imacy of inequality will increase over time. In sum, the members of a system of inequality 
who have not adapted their propriety beliefs to the perceived validity of inequality will be 
gradually replaced by cohorts with more favorable propriety beliefs about inequality:  
Hypothesis 3: The process of replacement facilitates the legitimation of ine-
quality among the new members of a system of inequality over time.  
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METHODS 
The German Reunification as a Research Context 
We tested our hypotheses in the context of the German reunification. The division of 
Germany began with its separation into French, British, U.S., and Soviet occupational zones 
after World War II. A series of political developments culminated in the formation of two 
German states in 1949: the FRG, which resulted from the merging of the French, British, and 
U.S. zones, and the GDR, which was established in the territory of the Soviet zone. The FRG 
became a democratic state and established a capitalist economy that was based largely on 
competition between economic actors and on the right to private property (Kornai, 2000). 
Conversely, the GDR became a socialist republic and established a socialist economy that 
emphasized centralized planning and state ownership of the means of production (Kornai, 
2000).  
In the 1980s, the GDR experienced growing consternation over deficiencies in produc-
tion, infrastructure, and political freedom (Patton, 2011). By the end of the 1980s, increasing 
numbers of refugees regularly left East Germany for the West, while GDR citizens began or-
ganizing peaceful protests against the GDR government. As a result of these developments as 
well as of broader political developments—notably, glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Un-
ion (Patton, 2011)—the GDR’s political leadership allowed GDR citizens to cross the border 
formally, which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Immediately thereafter, 
the GDR and the FRG began negotiations about their reunification. This process, which was 
formally concluded on October 3, 1990, included the complete integration of the GDR into 
the political and economic system of the FRG.  
The context of the German reunification lends itself to a study of the legitimation of in-
equality for two reasons. First, capitalist systems and socialist systems differ markedly with 
regard to the validity of social and economic inequality (e.g., van der Toorn et al., 2010). Cap-
italist systems are built on the principle of equity, which states that individuals should be re-
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warded for demonstrating greater productivity by receiving more resources (e.g., a higher in-
come); thus, it is fair to assume that a certain degree of inequality is widely regarded as ac-
ceptable in capitalist systems (Wu, 2009). Socialist systems, on the other hand, are built on 
the principle of equality, according to which individuals should receive similar portions of 
resources regardless of their individual productivity (e.g., a similar income); thus, it is fair to 
assume that inequality is widely regarded as invalid and inacceptable in socialist systems. 
These assumptions are supported by research demonstrating that beliefs about the legitimacy 
of income inequality differed between socialist countries in Eastern Europe and capitalist 
countries in 1987 and that the East European public “held strongly egalitarian norms up to the 
last days of Communism” (Kelley and Zagorski, 2004, p. 351).  
The ideological differences between the GDR and the FRG are also mirrored in the ac-
tual differences in the level of inequality that characterized each society. Income inequality 
was much higher in the FRG than in the GDR; in 1990, the Gini coefficient was about 150 
percent higher in the FRG than in the GDR (Hauser and Becker, 1997). Fritze concluded that 
before reunification, the majority of East Germans had, unlike the citizens of the FRG, “inter-
nalized socialist values including conceptions of social equality, equity, equal opportunity and 
solidarity. Everybody was equal and employed” (1995, p. 10, quoted in Noll, 1996); transla-
tion by the authors).   
Second, although several countries (e.g., Russia, Poland) experienced a similar transi-
tion from socialism to capitalism, the German reunification offers a unique context because it 
resembles a natural experiment (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) with clearly de-
fined subpopulations and a clearly defined external event (i.e., the transition from a context of 
relative equality to a context of relative inequality). As a consequence, changes in beliefs 
about the legitimacy of inequality can be plausibly attributed to the external event (Dunning, 
2012). In our research context, only the citizens of the GDR experienced a transition, whereas 
the citizens of the FRG were less affected by the reunification. The contrast between the 
20 
 
treatment condition—the GDR—and the control condition—the FRG—that arose naturally as 
a result of reunification allowed us to control for confounding effects at the state level (e.g., 
governmental changes and economic downturns) that might affect the legitimation of inequal-
ity after reunification. 
Data and Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we used secondary data from the German General Social Survey 
(GGSS), a biennial survey on the values and attitudes of the German population (GESIS - 
Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2016). Trained interviewers conducted face-to-face 
interviews with about 3,000 Germans drawn from a random sample of the population (18 
years and older). 
We restricted our sample to native German citizens, excluding anyone who had immi-
grated to Germany. We also excluded respondents born in or after 1989, as these respondents 
would be too young to have experienced the transition from socialism to capitalism. We lim-
ited the analysis to eight waves of GGSS data (1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010, 
and 2014), because some of our variables had not been included in all waves. After eliminat-
ing respondents with incomplete data, the final sample included 13,812 observations.  
Dependent Variable 
To measure beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality, we used three items from the 
scale by Mayer, Kraus and Schmidt (2014), which is included in multiple waves of the GGSS: 
(1) “Only when differences in income and in social standing are large enough is there an in-
centive for individual achievement”; (2) “Differences in status between people are acceptable 
because they basically reflect what people have made of the opportunities they have had”; and 
(3) “On the whole, I consider the social differences in our country just.” The items were 
measured on a four-point scale (1 = “Completely disagree”; 4 = “Completely agree”). The 
reliability of the scale was acceptable (α = 0.67).  
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To assess whether the items reflected a latent construct, we randomly split our sample 
into two groups and conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for the first half of the sam-
ple and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for the second half. We included ten additional 
items from the GGSS (available upon request) that ascertain whether individuals think that 
upward social mobility is due to meritocratic principles (e.g., ability, intelligence) or ascrip-
tive principles (e.g., social origin, networks) in the EFA (Noll and Roberts, 2003). A principal 
component factor analysis with varimax rotation indicated a three-factor solution and showed 
that the three items loaded (loadingmin = |0.70|) on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.75). Also, 
the three items had low cross-loadings on the two other factors (loadingmax ≤ |0.15|), and the 
additional items had low cross-loadings on our dependent variable (loadingmax ≤ |0.21|). The 
CFA also indicated a good fit of the three-factor structure (χ² = 661.49; p < 0.001; df = 62; 
CFI = 0.91; TLI = 0.88; SRMR = 0.049; RMSEA = 0.051). Chi-square difference tests sug-
gested that the 3-factor model provided a better fit (p < 0.001) than competing models (two 2-
factor models and a 1-factor model). In summary, the results showed that the three items re-
flect a single factor and that the construct is distinguishable from related constructs. 
Finally, we tested the criterion-related validity of our construct. Previous studies (e.g., 
Finseraas, 2009) indicated a relationship between inequality and the demand for the redistri-
bution of societal resources (e.g., income). We used two questions from the GGSS to capture 
the respondents’ preferences for redistribution: “Should social benefits be cut in the future, 
should things stay as they are, or should social benefits be extended?” (1 = “should be cut”; 2 
= “should stay as they are”; 3 = “should be extended”) and “By and large, economic profits 
are nowadays distributed fairly in Germany” (1 = “completely disagree”; 4 = “completely 
agree”). We found that individuals’ beliefs in the legitimacy of inequality had a negative cor-
relation with their preferences for extending social benefits (r = -0.26; p < 0.001), and their 
beliefs about whether economic profits are distributed fairly (r = 0.36; p < 0.001). These find-
ings provide evidence for the construct’s criterion-related validity. 
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Independent and Moderator Variables 
The primary independent variable in our study is whether the respondents had lived in 
the GDR prior to 1990, because only people who were born and lived in the GDR before reu-
nification experienced the transition from an equality context (socialism) to an inequality con-
text (capitalism). The GGSS conducted in 1991, 1994, 2000 and 2004 contain information 
about the respondents’ place of birth. We created a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
respondent was born in the GDR and 0 if the respondent was born in the FRG. Because the 
GGSS conducted in 1998, 2008, 2010 and 2014 contained no information about the respond-
ents’ place of birth, we used information about the place where respondents lived in their 
youth. This information is a valid indicator of a person’s place of birth, because moving from 
the GDR to the FRG was almost impossible after the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961. We 
coded the dummy variable as 1 if the respondent had lived in the GDR during his or her youth 
and as 0 if the respondent had lived in the FRG. 
To analyze the effects of the processes of adaptation (Hypothesis 1), we constructed a 
variable called years spent in Germany after 1990 that reflected the number of years a re-
spondent had lived in reunified Germany after 1990 (for a similar approach, see Firebaugh, 
1989). The variable can take values from 1 (the respondent was surveyed in 1991) to 24 (the 
respondent was surveyed in 2014). 
To analyze the effects of cohort replacement (Hypothesis 3), we constructed a variable 
called years spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990 that reflected how long a respondent had 
lived in either half of the divided Germany up to reunification. Because the GGSS contains no 
question asking how many years a respondent spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990, we used 
an indirect measure. Given that emigration from East Germany to West Germany was very 
difficult, we measured the years a respondent had spent in the GDR/FRG between the year 
1945, when Germany was split into occupational zones, and 1990, when the two German 
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states were reunited. To do so, we calculated the difference between a respondent’s year of 
birth and the year 1990. This variable can take values from 1 to 45.  
Control Variables 
We included several variables to rule out alternative explanations. First, we controlled 
for the respondents’ income, because this variable affects system justification (Jost et al., 
2003c). We measured the variable by using the natural logarithm of the monthly net family 
income. Second, we included the respondents’ self-assessed current financial situation to con-
trol for differences in wealth. The financial situation was measured on a five-point scale (1 = 
very bad; 5 = very good). Third, we created a dummy variable that captured whether the re-
spondents were unemployed (1 = yes) at the time of the interview, which might affect their 
belief in the legitimacy of inequality. Fourth, we controlled for the respondents’ level of edu-
cation, because less educated persons are more likely to perceive social inequalities as just 
(Jost et al., 2003c). We constructed dummy variables for low levels of education (1 = yes) and 
medium levels of education (1 = yes). A low level of education meant that the respondents had 
either no school certificate or only a “basic” secondary school certificate (from a secondary 
school known in Germany as a “Hauptschule”), while a medium level meant that the respond-
ents had graduated from “intermediate” high school (i.e., from the “Realschule”). Respond-
ents with a university-entrance certificate (i.e., “Abitur”) or an academic degree were consid-
ered to have a high level of education, which was the reference category. Fifth, because liber-
als and conservatives tend to hold different beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality (Jost et 
al., 2003b), we controlled for the respondents’ political view, which was measured on a ten-
point scale (1 = left-wing; 10 = right-wing). Sixth, we controlled for key demographic varia-
bles by including a dummy variable to control for gender (0 = male; 1 = female) and a varia-
ble to control for age. Finally, we included dummy variables for each wave of the GGSS to 
control for year fixed-effects.  
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Statistical Analyses 
The GGSS does not represent a panel; in other words, it does not provide repeated ob-
servations for all respondents. Rather, it uses a cross-sectional repeated measures design, 
which means that a random sample of the German population is surveyed in different years. 
Repeated cross sections are comparable to panel data, provided that two conditions are met. 
First, the dependent variable must be unrelated to population replacement within a cohort 
(Firebaugh, 1992). That is, the death rates of individuals from the same cohort exhibiting high 
and low levels of the dependent variable should be the same. This condition is likely to be ful-
filled in our study, because we have no evidence that the propriety beliefs of East Germans 
are correlated with mortality. Second, the size of each sample should exceed a threshold (e.g., 
200 observations, see Verbeek and Nijman, 1992) to reduce bias in the population mean. Be-
cause the sample size in our study exceeds 1,500 observations in each wave, we expect no 
bias in the population mean. Following previous studies (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 
2007), we analyzed our data using OLS with robust standard errors. We conducted all anal-
yses using Stata 14.  
An important difference between this study and previous studies on social change (e.g., 
Cotter et al., 2011) is that, while previous studies aimed to explain absolute changes in peo-
ple’s attitudes, we focus on relative changes—that is, on how the differences between the be-
liefs of our control group (West Germans) and our treatment group (East Germans) about the 
legitimacy of inequality changed over time. As we explained earlier, because both groups live 
in reunified Germany, they are similarly affected by external events (e.g., economic condi-
tions) that can influence an individual’s belief in the legitimacy of inequality. Thus, changes 
in the differences between the beliefs that each group holds about the legitimacy of inequality 
are likely to have been caused by the mechanisms we have described and not by unobserved 
external events (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007).  
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RESULTS 
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics. We detected a high correlation between 
age and the number of years spent in the GDR or FRG prior to 1990 (r = 0.85; p < 0.001), and 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) indicated potential problems of multicollinearity (VIFage = 
8.61). To check whether multicollinearity affected our results, we ran all regressions again, 
excluding age. The results were completely identical, indicating that our models are not af-
fected by multicollinearity. This allowed us to include age as a control variable. We mean-
centered all continuous variables to improve interpretation.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Before testing the hypotheses, we explored how the beliefs that the former citizens of 
the GDR and the FRG held about the legitimacy of inequality developed over time. Figure 1 
shows that these differences between former GDR citizens and former FRG citizens increased 
between 1991 and 1998; between 2000 and 2014, however, they decreased. One remarkable 
finding is that in 1991—barely one year after reunification—the differences in beliefs about 
the legitimacy of inequality between former GDR citizens and former FRG citizens were ra-
ther low. Indeed, on the basis of our theory, we expected that former GDR citizens would ini-
tially feel that inequality lacks legitimacy, because equality was an important principle of the 
socialist system. We will explore this finding in more detail in the next section. Because the 
very low difference in propriety beliefs between former GDR citizens and former FRG citi-
zens is likely to be an outlier, we included in the regression the interaction term “lived in the 
GDR prior to 1990 x year 1991” to control for this interesting finding. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table II about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 1 posits that the legitimacy of inequality increases among the new members 
of a system of inequality over time, because they adapt their propriety beliefs to the perceived 
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validity of inequality. To test the hypothesis, we included in the regression the interaction 
term “lived in the GDR prior to 1990 x years spent in Germany after 1990” (see Table II, 
Model 2). This interaction term is positive and significant (b = 0.018; p < 0.001), supporting 
Hypothesis 1. As Figure 2 shows, the differences in the beliefs that former GDR citizens and 
former FRG citizens held about the legitimacy of inequality shrank over time. A simple slope 
analysis (Dawson, 2014) indicates that the difference between East Germans and West Ger-
mans is significant at each value of the moderator (p < 0.05) but shrinks over time ( about 
0.50 in 1991 vs. about 0.10 in 2014). This result indicates that a process of adaptation took 
place. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that the change in the differences between former citizens 
of the GDR and FRG over time is mainly due to increases in propriety beliefs among former 
citizens of the GDR. 
Hypothesis 2 states that the longer new members of a system of inequality have been 
exposed to a system of equality, the slower will be their adaptation to the system of inequali-
ty. To test this hypothesis, we included a three-way interaction term in the regression (see Ta-
ble II, Model 3): “lived in the GDR prior to 1990 x years spent in Germany after 1990 x years 
spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990.” The results support Hypothesis 2: the coefficient of the 
interaction term was negative and significant (b = -0.0002; p = 0.044). To better interpret the 
result, we plotted the interaction for three groups: individuals who spent 15, or 30, or 45 
years, respectively, in the GDR or the FRG prior to 1990. As Figure 3 indicates, the new 
members of a system of inequality who were previously exposed to a system of equality for 
45 years take the longest to adapt to the new system, whereas the new members of a system of 
inequality who were previously exposed to a system of equality for 15 years are the fastest to 
adapt to the new system.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2, 3, and 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
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Hypothesis 3 posits that the replacement of older actors with new actors in a system of 
inequality increases the legitimation of inequality among the members of this system. To test 
this hypothesis, we included the interaction term “lived in the GDR prior to 1990 x years 
spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990” in the regression. The results (Table II, Model 2) sup-
port the hypothesis; the interaction term is negative and significant (b = -0.007; p < 0.001). As 
Figure 4 shows, inequality is generally perceived as more legitimate among people who were 
socialized in the GDR for a relatively short time than among people who had spent a greater 
part of their lives in the GDR; however, we did not observe similar differences between peo-
ple who were socialized for a relatively short time or relatively long time in the FRG. As the 
number of citizens who were not socialized in the former GDR increases, the population aver-
age of the years spent in the former GDR decreases (e.g., it dropped from 36.13 in 1994 to 
27.26 in 2014). The slope analysis further indicates that the difference between East Germans 
and West Germans is statistically significant at each value of the moderator (p < 0.05) but is 
more pronounced among East Germans who had spent more years in the former GDR (about 
0.38 after 45 years in the GDR; about 0.07 after 1 year in the GDR). This finding shows that, 
over time, replacement processes among former citizens of the GDR reduced the gap in be-
liefs about the legitimacy of inequality between the former citizens of the GDR and of the 
FRG. 
We also analyzed the relative contribution of processes of adaptation and replacement to 
this convergence of perceptions using the method of linear decomposition (Firebaugh, 1989). 
The calculation shows that the relative contribution of adaptation is about four times higher 
than the contribution of replacement (calculation details are available upon request).  
Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks 
We conducted several analyses to check the robustness of our findings and to provide 
additional insights. First, we ran additional analyses to explore why differences in propriety 
beliefs of former GDR and former FRG citizens were initially relatively small and then in-
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creased after 1991 (see Figure 1). We considered two explanations for this pattern. On the one 
hand, East Germans may have expected that their own economic situation would improve in 
the near future and therefore considered inequality to be relatively legitimate. On the other 
hand, this pattern may reflect a more general dissatisfaction with socialism among East Ger-
mans, making the capitalist system more attractive to them by comparison. We used two 
questions from the GGSS to examine whether these conjectures could explain the pattern: (1) 
“What will your own financial situation be like in one year?” (1 = “considerably worse than 
today”; 5 = “considerably better than today”); and (2) “Socialism is basically a good idea; it 
was just put into practice badly” (1 = “strongly disagree”; 4 = “strongly agree”). We used 
OLS to test for differences in the attitudes of former GDR citizens between the years 1991 
and 1994. The results showed that East Germans had higher expectations regarding their fu-
ture economic situation in 1991 than in 1994 (b = 0.21; p < 0.001); however, we found no 
significant differences with regard to attitudes towards socialism (b = -0.06; p = 0.28). There-
fore, we argue that initial euphoria among East Germans after reunification may explain the 
existence of only a small difference in the beliefs of East and West Germans about the legiti-
macy of inequality in 1991.  
Second, studies have indicated that West and East Germany were very similar before 
1945 (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007); however, it is possible that the observed differ-
ences in beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality may result from unobserved differences in 
attitudes and beliefs that existed before Germany was divided into two states. To test this al-
ternative explanation, we checked whether the differences in the propriety beliefs of respond-
ents who lived in adjacent regions—namely, East and West Berlin—were similar to the dif-
ferences in propriety beliefs between respondents who lived in East and West Germany in 
1991. If the observed differences in propriety beliefs are the result of unobserved differences 
that existed before Germany was divided, then the differences between the inhabitants of East 
and West Berlin should be smaller, because Germans living in different parts of Berlin were 
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unlikely to have had dissimilar beliefs before 1945. We found no significant difference in the 
coefficients of the variable lived in the GDR prior to 1990 between the two groups (χ² = 1.42; 
p = 0.23), which indicates that in 1991, the difference in propriety beliefs between the inhab-
itants of East and West Berlin was similar to the difference in propriety beliefs between the 
former citizens of the GDR and of the FRG. Thus, the observed differences in propriety be-
liefs are unlikely to have resulted from differences in those beliefs that are associated with the 
eastern and the western regions of Germany prior to 1945. 
Third, we explored whether East and West Germans who were born after reunification 
also differ in their propriety beliefs. If the differences we observed in our analyses are indeed 
the result of being socialized in different systems, there should be no differences between East 
and West Germans who were raised in reunified Germany. The OLS shows no difference in 
propriety beliefs between East and West Germans born in or after 1989 (b = -0.00; p = 0.997). 
This finding further increases our confidence that the differences we observed between East 
and West Germans result from being socialized in socialist and capitalist systems, respective-
ly. 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of this paper was to develop and test a novel theory on how economic and so-
cial inequality becomes legitimized among the members of a social system. To build and test 
our theory, we blended system justification theory with the theory of social judgment and then 
proceeded to explore the legitimation of inequality in the unique setting of a natural experi-
ment—the German reunification. From the perspective on legitimacy that we propose, we 
were able to identify two mechanisms through which inequality becomes legitimate. First, 
because the (perceived) validity of inequality influences the propriety beliefs about inequality 
that people form and hold, individuals exposed to inequality within a system adjust and up-
date their beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality. Second, the legitimation of inequality is 
driven by cohort replacement; however, this effect is weaker than the first. Overall, this study 
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offers important insights into the legitimation of inequality. In this section, we discuss the 
broader implications of our theorizing, the limitations of our approach, and the possibilities 
for future research.  
Theoretical Implications 
As a persistent characteristic of both Western and Eastern societies, inequality has at-
tracted the attention of both policy-makers and researchers. For instance, former U.S. Presi-
dent Barack Obama (2016) identified inequality as one of the four future challenges for the 
United States, while the Pew Research Center (2014) found that people all over the world 
consider inequality to be a major problem. Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
(2014) has arguably become one of the most influential contemporary books in economics. 
Although this seems to be “a golden age for studying inequality” (The Economist, 2016), sur-
prisingly little is known about why inequalities persist and why people, even those who are 
disadvantaged by inequality, tacitly approve of it (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). A first important 
insight of our study is that the legitimation of inequality is influenced by its perceived validi-
ty. By blending system justification theory and the theory of social judgment, we clarified that 
what individuals experience as inevitable, enduring, and collectively approved has a subtle 
but powerful impact on their propriety beliefs. We also showed that the process through 
which people adapt their propriety beliefs is complemented by a process of replacement, 
through which older cohorts are substituted by younger cohorts with more favorable beliefs 
about the legitimacy of inequality. Our empirical analysis shows that the influence of adapta-
tion is far stronger than the influence of replacement on legitimacy beliefs. Consequently, our 
findings indicate that the absence of public resentment toward inequality can be largely at-
tributed to institutionalized legitimacy beliefs that underpin and perpetuate social and eco-
nomic inequality.  
This study’s second contribution is that it provides insights into the subjective nature of 
legitimacy. Acknowledging that individuals are often active enactors of legitimacy, 
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Deephouse and Suchman (2008) called on researchers to focus on how and where legitimacy 
is constructed. Indeed, legitimacy as a “generalized perception” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) re-
flects the degree to which a particular legitimacy object gains collective approval. Collective 
approval is a subjectively created social construct that derives from the coalescence of indi-
vidual perceptions that ultimately develop in the eye of the beholder; that is, in the psyche of 
individuals (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). However, in recent organization and management 
research, hardly any studies have analyzed legitimacy empirically as a dependent variable 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Indeed, little is known about how individuals construe le-
gitimacy and how different beholders within a specific stakeholder group assess the propriety 
of organizations, practices, and other types of legitimacy objects (Tost, 2011). Previous stud-
ies on legitimacy described human action in terms of stimulus and response, overlooking the 
fact that “individuals actively participate in perceiving, interpreting, and making sense of their 
world” (Scott, 2008, p. 37). This approach implies that individuals either hold no prior propri-
ety beliefs or that prior propriety beliefs do not affect the formation of new legitimacy beliefs 
(Tost, 2011). Drawing on recent conceptual contributions to the social judgment perspective 
on legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011), our study indicates 
that previously held propriety beliefs influence the formation of new beliefs. Our research 
thus explains why different stakeholder groups (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012) and different indi-
viduals within these groups (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Voronov and Vince, 2012) may 
judge a legitimacy object very differently. In light of our findings, we recommend that future 
studies extend the current multi-level models of legitimacy to include a “historical” dimension 
acknowledging that “legitimacy is dependent on a history of events” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
These extended models should take into account that individuals “own” a history that they 
“carry” with them and that may affect their present and future legitimacy judgments, as well 
as the actions that follow from such judgments (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2011).  
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Our study also contributes to the development of a microfoundational research agenda 
in institutional theory. Although several scholars have encouraged research into the micro-
foundations of institutions (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2015; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Thornton 
et al., 2012) and inequality (e.g., Amis et al., 2017), few have responded to this call. Suddaby 
(2010) has criticized the disproportionate emphasis that scholars have placed on the structural 
aspects of institutions, such as isomorphism and decoupling, at the expense of their perceptual 
components and of the ideational processes that create meaning and legitimacy for organiza-
tional events and practices. Our study highlights that research on the microfoundations of in-
stitutions should not be limited to the micro level, on which psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics focus. On the contrary, researchers should seek to explain how phenomena at the mi-
cro level are linked to higher-level structures and outcomes (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Our 
integrative theory examines legitimacy at multiple interacting levels, viewing validity as a 
collective-level component of legitimacy and propriety and validity beliefs as individual-level 
components of legitimacy. We have also focused on theorizing and testing two important 
mechanisms, which we believe make legitimacy theory more supple and accurate but at the 
same time also more general (Stinchcombe, 1991). This study thus offers a rich opportunity 
for further research into the inter-subjective processes of perception, interpretation, interaction 
and meaning construction, which lie at the core of understanding institutional change and pro-
cesses of legitimation and institutionalization (Suddaby, 2010).  
Given that evaluators decide whether or not to support a practice depending on whether 
they believe that practice to be legitimate (Hoefer and Green, 2016; Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 
2011), our insights also have important implications for the study of management and organi-
zations in general, and particularly for research on organizational justice (e.g., Colquitt et al., 
2013; Greenberg and Colquitt, 2005) and the consequences of inequality in organizations 
(e.g., Bloom and Michel, 2002; Sieweke et al., 2016). For instance, previous research has 
shown that employee reactions to different forms of inequality (e.g., pay inequality, gender 
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inequality) depend on the extent to which such inequalities are perceived to be fair (e.g., 
Shore et al., 2006). Our study adds two novel concepts to this conversation that allow us to 
gain a better understanding of employees’ fairness perceptions and resulting reactions. First, 
employees’ propriety beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality can influence their fairness 
perceptions, thus indirectly affecting how they react to inequality. For instance, employees 
who deem inequality to be proper may also perceive it to be fair and thus react less negatively 
to it. Second, the validity of inequality within a team or an organization may further influence 
the perceived fairness of inequality, above and beyond the effect of propriety beliefs. In other 
words, employees who work in an organizational context in which they perceive that others 
perceive inequality to be appropriate will tend to react less negatively to inequality compared 
to those who work in a setting in which inequality is contested. Also, our findings suggest that 
employees who are embedded in a context in which a specific type of inequality is regarded 
as valid will adapt their propriety beliefs over time, meaning that their perception of the fair-
ness of that type of inequality is likely to increase the longer they work in that context. In-
deed, according to our integrative theory, we may even expect that employees who are em-
bedded in a context with high levels of inequality will tend to perceive inequality as fairer 
over time, as they increasingly perceive inequality as a social fact.  
Practical Implications 
Our research provides evidence that individuals react to actual or perceived inequality 
by adapting their legitimacy beliefs to the level of inequality that they experience. The impli-
cation of this finding is disturbing, as it suggests that informing and educating the public 
about growing levels of inequality may not necessarily promote resistance to this trend; in 
fact, it actually may have the counter-intuitive effect of legitimizing inequality (Trump, 2017). 
Nevertheless, policy-makers can help to delegitimize inequality and thus contribute to social 
justice and positive social change. From our integrated theory of inequality legitimation, it 
follows that the actual or perceived validity of equality (as the opposite of inequality) needs to 
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be strengthened. If equality is perceived as valid and collectively approved, then individuals 
will be more willing to endorse measures that promote equality and to assess inequality as 
improper.  
There are several ways of promoting such perceptions and, as a consequence, change in 
legitimacy beliefs about inequality. First, policy-makers can activate validity cues by stressing 
that a significant or growing number of actors work against the status quo. For instance, in the 
context of gender inequality, the British government found that when the same statistic was 
presented to companies positively (i.e., 94 percent of companies had at least one woman on 
their board) rather than negatively (i.e., only 17 percent of board members were women), 
these companies improved their promotion policies for women (Bohnet, 2016). Second, re-
search has shown that individuals are more willing to embrace change when it is perceived as 
natural (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) and inevitable or extremely likely to occur (Jost et 
al., 2015). Third, reference to tradition or to the longevity of a system leads to higher scores 
on system justification in surveys (Blanchar and Eidelman, 2013). By corollary, reducing the 
perceived longevity of a system of inequality and augmenting the perception that changing 
that system is consistent with established “scripts” may enhance the perception that a system 
can be changed and induce in people the motive to generate such change (Johnson and Fujita, 
2012).  
Amplifying the perception that practices leading to system change are becoming more 
widespread and persistent and that change is inevitable signals to evaluators that these prac-
tices are valid and thus offers an important strategy for delegitimizing systems of inequality 
and bringing about institutional change. As Kay and Zanna (2009) explained, changing per-
ceptions of the social context through actual changes to social reality (e.g., by introducing 
equality policies), changes in the perception of social reality (e.g., by launching media cam-
paigns that portray a considerable decline in inequality), or even changes in the perception of 
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where social reality is inevitably heading may represent a necessary (albeit insufficient) con-
dition for fostering support of a more equal status quo. 
Limitations and Future Research 
An unanticipated finding was that in 1991, the citizens of the former GDR and the FRG 
apparently held quite similar beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality. This finding was un-
expected because our theory suggested that after reunification, there would be pronounced 
differences in the propriety beliefs of former GDR and FRG citizens about inequality. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that GDR citizens resented the system in which they 
lived and desired the political liberties and material privileges that FRG citizens enjoyed. If 
GDR citizens not only resented the system but also felt that it lacked legitimacy, this may 
have affected their legitimacy beliefs about the system’s properties, including the principle of 
equality.  
We were also surprised to find that after 1991, the legitimacy beliefs of West Germany 
and East Germans diverged, whereas they started to converge after 1998 (see Figure 1). East 
Germans, as we found, expected their economic situation to improve in the reunified capitalist 
Germany. Research on legitimacy as a social judgment indicates that optimism and other 
types of positive affect can influence legitimacy judgments and can also induce positive legit-
imacy spillovers to entities affiliated with a focal legitimacy object (Haack et al., 2014). As a 
result of a positive spillover, positive emotions such as hope, gratitude, and euphoria, which 
East Germans generally experienced right after reunification, may have contributed to the le-
gitimation of the capitalist system and its properties among East Germans, including inequali-
ty. However, considering the divergence of legitimacy beliefs about inequality among former 
GDR and former FRG citizens after 1991, beliefs about the legitimacy of inequality among 
former GDR citizens apparently lacked strength and stability. It seems plausible to assume 
that many East Germans experienced disillusionment, disappointment, and shame when they 
were hit by economic hardship (e.g., the unemployment rate in the former territory of the 
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GDR grew to about 16 percent in 1994, see Flockton, 1998). In turn, and in line with the con-
jecture that legitimacy is based on emotional experience (e.g., Haack et al., 2014), negative 
affect may have reduced the approval rates of capitalism and its characteristics, including ine-
quality, among former GDR citizens.  
Unfortunately, our study is limited by the lack of information on legitimacy beliefs be-
fore reunification. This limitation makes it difficult to ascertain which explanation applies to 
our context. Anecdotal evidence suggests that legitimacy judgments about inequality in the 
former GDR were far from uniform, and the fact that none of the surveys on which we draw 
were taken before the fall of the Berlin Wall makes it rather difficult to assess reliably the re-
spondents’ beliefs about inequality before 1989. Thus, there is a need for research into the le-
gitimacy beliefs of East Germans about the GDR’s political system and its properties before 
reunification. Further research might explore behavioral measures of legitimacy beliefs about 
the socialist system. One such measure might involve assessing activities that signal protest 
against the system, such as vandalism (e.g., graffiti) and various forms of cultural resistance 
that indicate non-conformity (e.g., tattoos or the distribution of politically critical pop songs).  
Further research should be undertaken to develop a more fine-grained understanding of 
legitimacy in the sense of acceptability and tacit approval (i.e., “weak validation”) versus le-
gitimacy grounded in active and extensive support and endorsement (i.e., “strong validation”). 
Specifically, we consider it important to theorize the threshold levels at which controversial 
legitimacy objects (e.g., organizations or practices) shift from being considered acceptable to 
being considered unacceptable. Related to our examination, how low would the ratings for 
inequality have to go to be considered not tacit approval but rather disapproval, with the pro-
spect of inciting resistance and thus social change (Tost, 2011)? With respect to institutionali-
zation, how pervasive does such a low rating needs to be in order to cause inequality to be 
considered unacceptable? Suddaby and colleagues (2017) posited that, in extreme cases, legit-
imacy objects can remain valid even though not a single evaluator privately endorses the ob-
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ject (i.e., propriety is zero) or even though all evaluators privately oppose the object (i.e., pro-
priety is negative). In this view, very low and even negative ratings among a majority of eval-
uators may not preclude the acceptability and stability of systems of inequality and other 
forms of social dominance. 
As we discussed earlier, the mechanisms that we found to contribute to the legitimation 
of inequality may also be used to delegitimize inequality. For instance, if the new members of 
a system do not view inequality as legitimate, replacement may delegitimize rather than legit-
imize inequality. In other words, while we identified adaptation and replacement as two major 
mechanisms of inequality legitimation, the same mechanisms may work in the opposite direc-
tion in other contexts. This suggests that our theory may relate generally to changes in the sta-
tus quo rather than to changes associated specifically with inequality. In sum, there is abun-
dant room for specifying and further testing the boundaries of our integrative theory.  
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NOTES 
                                                          
i Propriety beliefs are the content of “propriety judgments” (Hoefer and Green, 2016). In this paper, we draw on 
the more basic belief concept, because our propriety measure captures beliefs, not judgments (see the methods 
section below). 
 
 
  
39 
 
REFERENCES 
Alesina, A., Di Tella, R. and MacCulloch, R. (2004). 'Inequality and happiness: Are 
Europeans and Americans different?'. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2009-42. 
Alesina, A. and Fuchs-Schündeln, N. (2007). 'Good-bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of 
communism on people's preferences'. American Economic Review, 97, 1507-28. 
Amis, J., Munir, K. and Mair, J. (2017). 'Institutions and economic inequality'. In Greenwood, 
R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T. B. and Meyer, R. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Ashforth, B. E. and Gibbs, B. W. (1990). 'The double-edge of organizational legitimation'. 
Organization Science, 1, 177-94. 
Austen, S. (2002). 'An international comparison of attitudes to inequality'. International 
Journal of Social Economics, 29, 218-37. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory.  New York: General Learning Press. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967). The social construction of reality - A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge.  New York: Anchor Books. 
Bitektine, A. (2011). 'Toward a theory of social judgments of organizations: The case of 
legitimacy, reputation, and status'. Academy of Management Review, 36, 151-79. 
Bitektine, A. and Haack, P. (2015). 'The macro and the micro of legitimacy: Towards a multi-
level theory of the legitimacy process'. Academy of Management Review, 40, 49-75. 
Blanchar, J. C. and Eidelman, S. (2013). 'Perceived system longevity increases system 
justification and the legitimacy of inequality'. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
43, 238-45. 
Bloom, M. and Michel, J. G. (2002). 'The relationships among organizational context, pay 
dispersion, and managerial turnover'. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 33-42. 
Bohnet, I. (2016). What works: Gender equality by design.  Harvard: Harvard University 
Press. 
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., Rodell, J. B., Long, D. M., Zapata, C. P., Conlon, D. E.et al. 
(2013). 'Justice at the millennium, a decade later: A meta-analytic test of social 
exchange and affect-based perspectives'. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98, 199-236. 
Cornelissen, J. P., Durand, R., Fiss, P. C., Lammers, J. C. and Vaara, E. (2015). 'Putting 
communication front and center in institutional theory and analysis'. Academy of 
Management Review, 40, 10-27. 
Costa-Lopes, R., Dovidio, J. F., Pereira, C. R. and Jost, J. T. (2013). 'Social psychological 
perspectives on the legitimation of social inequality: Past, present and future'. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 229-37. 
Cotter, D., Hermsen, J. M. and Vanneman, R. (2011). 'The end of the gender revolution? 
Gender role attitudes from 1977 to 2008'. American Journal of Sociology, 117, 259-
89. 
Dawson, J. F. (2014). 'Moderation in management research: What, why, when, and how'. 
Journal of Business and Psychology, 29, 1-19. 
Deephouse, D. L., Bundy, J., Tost, L. P. and Suchman, M. (2017). 'Organizational legitimacy: 
Six key questions'. In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T. B. and Meyer, R. 
(Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism (2nd edition). Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 27-54. 
Deephouse, D. L. and Suchman, M. (2008). 'Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism'. In 
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Suddaby, R. and Sahlin, K. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 49-77. 
Della-Fave, L. R. (1986). 'Toward an explication of the legitimation process'. Social Forces, 
65, 476-500. 
40 
 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1991). 'Introduction'. In Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. 
J. (Eds.), The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1-38. 
Dunning, T. (2012). Natural experiments in the social sciences.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Felin, T., Foss, N. J. and Ployhart, R. E. (2015). 'The microfoundations movement in strategy 
and organization theory'. Academy of Management Annals, 9, 575-632. 
Finseraas, H. (2009). 'Income inequality and demand for redistribution: a multilevel analysis 
of European public opinion'. Scandinavian Political Studies, 32, 94-119. 
Firebaugh, G. (1989). 'Methods for estimating cohort replacement effects'. Sociological 
Methodology, 19, 243-62. 
Firebaugh, G. (1992). 'Where does social-change come from? Estimating the relative 
contributions of individual change and population turnover'. Population Research and 
Policy Review, 11, 1-20. 
Fiske, S. and Taylor, S. (2013). Social cognition: From brains to culture.  London: Sage. 
Flockton, C. (1998). 'The German economy since 1989/90: Problems and prospects'. In 
Larres, K. (Ed.), Germany since unification: The domestic and external consequences. 
London: Macmillan, 63-87. 
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. (2016). Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage 
der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS - Kumulation 1980-2014. Köln: GESIS 
Datenarchiv. 
Greenberg, J. (2010). 'Organizational injustice as an occupational health risk'. Academy of 
Management Annals, 4, 205-43. 
Greenberg, J. and Colquitt, J. A. (Eds.). (2005). Hanbook of organizational justice. New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Haack, P., Pfarrer, M. and Scherer, A. G. (2014). 'Legitimacy-as-feeling: How affect leads to 
vertical legitimacy spillovers in transnational governance'. Journal of Management 
Studies, 51, 634-66. 
Halter, D., Oechslin, M. and Zweimuller, J. (2014). 'Inequality and growth: The neglected 
time dimension'. Journal of Economic Growth, 19, 81-104. 
Hauser, R. and Becker, I. (1997). 'The development of income distribution in the Federal 
Republic of Germany during the 1970s and 1980s'. In Gottschalk, P., Gustafsson, B. 
A. and Palmer, E. E. (Eds.), Changing Patterns in the Distribution of Economic 
Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University PRess, 184-219. 
Hoefer, R. L. and Green, S. E. (2016). 'A rhetorical model of institutional decision making: 
The role of rhetoric in the formation and change of legitimacy judgments'. Academy of 
Management Review, 41, 130-50. 
Huy, Q. N., Corley, K. G. and Kraatz, M. S. (2014). 'From support to mutiny: Shifting 
legitimacy judgments and emotional reactions impacting the implementation of radical 
change'. Academy of Management Journal, 57, 1650-80. 
Ibarra, H. (1999). 'Provisional selves: Experimenting with image and identity in professional 
adaptation'. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 764-91. 
Johnson, C. (2004). 'Introduction: Legtimacy processes in organizations'. Research in the 
Sociology of Organizations, 22, 1-24. 
Johnson, C., Dowd, T. J. and Ridgeway, C. L. (2006). 'Legitimacy as a social process'. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 32, 53-78. 
Johnson, I. R. and Fujita, K. (2012). 'Change we can believe in: Using perceptions of 
changeability to promote system-change motives over system-justification motives in 
information search'. Psychological Science, 23, 133-40. 
Jost, J. T. and Banaji, M. R. (1994). 'The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the 
production of false consciousness'. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1-27. 
41 
 
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R. and Nosek, B. A. (2004). 'A decade of system justification theory: 
Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo'. 
Political Psychology, 25, 881-919. 
Jost, J. T., Blount, S., Pfeffer, J. and Hunyady, G. (2003a). 'Fair market ideology: Its 
cognitive-motivational underpinnings'. Research in Organizational Behavior, 25, 53-
91. 
Jost, J. T., Gaucher, D. and Stern, C. (2015). '"The world isn’t fair" - A system justification 
perspective on social stratification and inequality'. In Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 
(Eds.), APA handbook of personality and social psychology. Washington: American 
Psychological Association, Vol. 2, 317-40. 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W. and Sulloway, F. J. (2003b). 'Political conservatism 
as motivated social cognition'. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-75. 
Jost, J. T. and Hunyady, O. (2005). 'Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying 
ideologies'. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 260-65. 
Jost, J. T. and Major, B. (2001). The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on 
ideology, justice, and intergroup relations.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O. and Ni Sullivan, B. (2003c). 'Social inequality and the 
reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced 
system justification among the disadvantaged'. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 33, 13-36. 
Kay, A. C., Czaplinski, S. and Jost, J. T. (2009a). 'Left-right ideological differences in system 
justification following exposure to complementary versus noncomplementary 
stereotype exemplars'. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 290-98. 
Kay, A. C. and Friesen, J. (2011). 'On social stability and social change: Understanding when 
system justification does and does not occur'. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 20, 360-64. 
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Peach, J. M., Laurin, K., Friesen, J., Zanna, M. P.et al. (2009b). 
'Inequality, discrimination, and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a 
motivation to see the way things are as the way they should be'. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 97, 421-34. 
Kelley, J. and Zagorski, K. (2004). 'Economic change and the legitimation of inequality: The 
transition from socialism to the free market in Central-East Europe'. Research in 
Social Stratification and Mobility, 22, 319-64. 
King, B. (2011). Cohort replacement and institutional change. Available at:  
https://orgtheory.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/cohort-replacement-and-institutional-
change/ [accessed 6 April 2016]. 
Kornai, J. (2000). 'What the change of system from socialism to capitalism does and does not 
mean'. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 27-42. 
Lamin, A. and Zaheer, S. (2012). 'Wall Street vs. Main Street: Firm strategies for defending 
legitimacy and their impact on different stakeholders'. Organization Science, 23, 47-
66. 
Lange, D. and Washburn, N. T. (2012). 'Understanding attributions of corporate social 
irresponsibility'. Academy of Management Review, 37, 300-26. 
Laurin, K., Gaucher, D. and Kay, A. (2013). 'Stability and the justification of social 
inequality'. European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 246-54. 
Lawrence, T. B., Suddaby, R. and Leca, B. (2011). 'Institutional work: Refocusing 
institutional studies of organizations'. Journal of Management Inquiry, 20, 52-58. 
Lok, J. (2010). 'Institutional logics as identity projects'. Academy of Management Journal, 53, 
1305-35. 
Luttig, M. (2013). 'The structure of inequality and Americans' attitudes toward redistribution'. 
Public opinion quarterly, 77, 811-21. 
42 
 
Mayer, K. U., Kraus, V. and Schmidt, P. (2014). Sozial Ungleichheit. [Social inequality]: 
Zusammenstellung sozialwissenschaftlicher Items und Skalen. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). 'Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises'. 
Review of General Psychology, 2, 175-220. 
Noll, H.-H. (1996). Ungleichheit der Lebenslagen und ihre Legitimation im 
Transformationsprozeß: Fakten, Perzeptionen und Bewertungen. Paper presented at 
the Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie. 
Noll, H.-H. and Roberts, L. W. (2003). 'The legitimacy of inequality on both sides of the 
Atlantic. A comparative analysis of attitudes in Canada and Germany'. The 
Tocqueville Review, 24, 153-89. 
Obama, B. (2016). State of the Union address. Available at:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-–-prepared-delivery-state-
union-address [accessed 28 March 2016]. 
Okhuysen, G. and Bonardi, J.-P. (2011). 'The challenges of theory building through the 
combination of lenses'. Academy of Management Review, 36, 6-11. 
Patton, D. F. (2011). 'Annus mirabilis: 1989 and German Unification'. In Walser Smith, H. 
(Ed.), The Oxford handbook of modern German history. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 753-74. 
Pew Research Center. (2014). Inequality seen as major challenge. Available at:  
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economies-much-
more-optimistic-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/inequality-11/ [accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
Pickett, K. E. and Wilkinson, R. G. (2015). 'Income inequality and health: A causal review'. 
Social Science & Medicine, 128, 316-26. 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century.  Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Powell, W. W. and Colyvas, J. A. (2008). 'Microfoundations of institutional theory'. In 
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K. and Suddaby, R. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism. Los Angeles: Sage, 276-98. 
Ryder, N. B. (1965). 'The cohort as a concept in the study of social change'. American 
Sociological Review, 30, 843-61. 
Schützwohl, A. (1998). 'Surprise and schema strength'. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 24, 1182-99. 
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations.  Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Sherif, M. and Hovland, C. (1961). Social judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects in 
communication and attitude change.  Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Shore, T. H., Tashchian, A. and Jourdan, L. (2006). 'Effects of internal and external pay 
comparisons on work attitudes'. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 2578-98. 
Sieweke, J. (2014). 'Pierre Bourdieu in management and organization studies—A citation 
context analysis and discussion of contributions'. Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 30, 532-43. 
Sieweke, J., Köllner, B. and Süß, S. (2016). 'The relationship between employees' objective 
internal and external pay standing and their job performance: A within-person 
analysis'. Journal of Business and Psychology, forthcoming. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1991). 'The conditions of fruitfulness of theorizing about mechanisms in 
social science'. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 21, 367-88. 
Stryker, R. (1994). 'Rules, resources, and legitimacy processes: Some implications for social 
conflict, order, and change'. American Journal of Sociology, 99, 847-910. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). 'Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches'. 
Academy of Management Review, 20, 571-610. 
43 
 
Suddaby, R. (2010). 'Challenges for institutional theory'. Journal of Management Inquiry, 19, 
14-20. 
Suddaby, R., Bitektine, A. and Haack, P. (2017). 'Legitimacy'. Academy of Management 
Annals, 11, 451-78. 
Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R. (2005). 'Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy'. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 50, 35-67. 
Taber, C. S. and Lodge, M. (2006). 'Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political 
beliefs'. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 755-69. 
The Economist. (2016). The new wave. Available at:  http://www.economist.com/news/books-
and-arts/21695853-surprisingly-little-known-about-causes-inequality-serbian-
american-economist [accessed 03 April 2016]. 
The Guardian. (2016). Richest 62 people as wealthy as half of world's population, says 
Oxfam. Available at:  http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/18/richest-62-
billionaires-wealthy-half-world-population-combined [accessed 5 April 2016]. 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W. and Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics perspective - 
A new approach to culture, structure, and process.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tilcsik, A. (2010). 'From ritual to reality: Demography, ideology, and decoupling in a post-
communist government agency'. Academy of Management Journal, 53, 1474-98. 
Tost, L. P. (2011). 'An integrative model of legitimacy judgments'. Academy of Management 
Review, 36, 686-710. 
Trump, K.-S. (2017). 'Income inequality influences perceptions of legitimate income 
differences'. British Journal of Political Science. 
Tyler, T. R. (2006). 'Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation'. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 57, 375-400. 
van der Toorn, J., Berkics, M. and Jost, J. T. (2010). 'System justification, satisfaction, and 
perceptions of fairness and typicality at work: A cross-system comparison involving 
the US and Hungary'. Social Justice Research, 23, 189-210. 
Verbeek, M. and Nijman, T. (1992). 'Can cohort data be treated as genuine panel data?'. 
Empirical Economics, 17, 9-23. 
Voronov, M. and Vince, R. (2012). 'Integrating emotions into the analysis of institutional 
work'. Academy of Management Review, 37, 58-81. 
Walker, H. A., Rogers, L. and Zelditch, M. (1988). 'Legitimacy and collective action: A 
research note'. Social Forces, 67, 216-28. 
Walker, H. A., Thomas, G. M. and Zelditch, M. (1986). 'Legitimation, endorsement, and 
stability'. Social Forces, 64, 620-43. 
Wang, S.-H. and Morris, R. G. M. (2010). 'Hippocampal-neocortical interactions in memory 
formation, consolidation, and reconsolidation'. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 49-
79. 
Wu, X. (2009). 'Income inequality and distributive justice: A comparative analysis of 
mainland China and Hong Kong'. The China Quarterly, 1033-52. 
Yoon, J. and Thye, S. (2011). 'A theoretical model and new test of managerial legitimacy in 
work teams'. Social Forces, 90, 639-59. 
Zelditch, M. (2001a). 'Processes of legitimation: Recent developments and new directions'. 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 64, 4-17. 
Zelditch, M. (2001b). 'Theories of legitimacy'. In Jost, J. T. and Major, B. (Eds.), The 
psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup 
relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 33-53. 
Zelditch, M. (2004). 'Institutional effects on the stability of organizational authority'. 
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 22, 25-48. 
Zelditch, M. and Walker, H. A. (1984). 'Legitimacy and the stability of authority'. Advances 
in Group Processes, 1, 1-25. 
44 
 
Zimmerman, M. A. and Zeitz, G. J. (2002). 'Beyond survival: Achieving new venture growth 
by building legitimacy'. Academy of Management Review, 27, 414-31. 
 
 45 
 
Table I 
Correlations and Descriptive Statisticsa 
 Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Belief in the legitimacy of inequality 2.36 0.70            
2. Gender (1 = female) 0.51 0.50 -0.08           
3. Incomeb 7.46 0.63 0.11 -0.12          
4. Financial situation 3.37 0.84 0.19 -0.05 0.38         
5. Unemployed (1 = yes) 0.07 0.25 -0.10 -0.00 -0.24 -0.29        
6. Age 49.45 16.80 0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.08 -0.11       
7. Low level of education (1 = yes) 0.42 0.49 0.11 0.02 -0.27 -0.11 0.01 0.36      
8. Medium level of education (1 = yes) 0.33 0.47 -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.23 -0.61     
9. Political view 5.00 1.72 0.21 -0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.00    
10. Lived in the GDR prior to 1990 (1 = yes) 0.43 0.50 -0.22 0.02 -0.25 -0.12 0.15 0.06 -0.10 0.18 -0.13   
11. Years spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990 32.41 12.53 0.10 0.02 -0.18 0.05 -0.06 0.85 0.37 -0.19 0.03 0.08  
12. Years spent in Germany after 1990 11.88 7.55 0.01 -0.02 0.34 -0.05 -0.04 0.14 -0.14 0.02 -0.00 -0.07 -0.27 
an = 13,812; all r ≥ |0.02| are significant at p ≤ 0.05; two-tailed tests. 
b Logarithmized. 
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TABLE II 
Results of OLS Analysesa  
Variables Hypothesis Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable: Belief in the legitimacy of inequality 
Control variables     
Intercept  2.39*** (0.02) 2.49*** (0.09) 2.57*** (0.02) 
Gender (1 = female)  -0.09*** (0.01) -0.09*** (0.01) -0.09*** (0.01) 
Incomeb  0.08***(0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 
Financial situation  0.12*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 
Unemployed (1 = yes)  -0.07** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Age  0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
Low level of education (1 = yes)  0.17*** (0.02) 0.14*** (0.02) 0.14*** (0.02) 
Medium level of education (1 = yes)  0.04** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 
Political view  0.07*** (0.00) 0.06*** (0.00) 0.06*** (0.00) 
Year dummies included  Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variables     
Lived in the GDR prior to 1990 (1 = yes)   -0.31*** (0.01) -0.27*** (0.01) 
Years spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990   0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Years spent in Germany after 1990   -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 
Interaction effects     
Lived in the GDR prior to 1990 x Years 
spent in Germany after 1990 
H1 
 
0.02*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 
Lived in the GDR prior to 1990 x Years 
spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990 
H3  -0.01
*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 
Years spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990 
x Years spent in Germany after 1990 
   0.0002
* (0.0001) 
Lived in the GDR prior to 1990 x Years 
spent in the GDR/FRG prior to 1990 x 
Years spent in Germany after 1990 
H2  
 -0.0002* (0.0001) 
F  114.29*** 124.46*** 117.30*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.105 0.146 0.143 
N  13,812 13,812 13,812 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
a + p ≤ 0.10; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001; two-tailed tests. 
b Logarithmized. 
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FIGURE 1 
Changes in Beliefs About the Legitimacy of Inequality Between 1991 and 2014 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Interaction Between the Number of Years Spent in Germany After 1990 and 
Whether the Respondents Had Lived in the FRG or GDR Prior to 1990  
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FIGURE 3 
Interaction Between the Number of Years Spent in the GDR/FRG Prior to 1990, 
the Number of Years Spent in Germany After 1990, and Whether the Respondents 
Had Lived in the FRG or GDR Prior to 1990 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Interaction Between the Number of Years Spent in the GDR/FRG Prior to 1990 
and Whether the Respondents Had Lived in the FRG or GDR Prior to 1990 
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